SOCIAL SCIENCES

JAN 28 1957
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NATIONAL REVIEW

20 Cents

February 2, 1957

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

What Is the Republic?

RUSSELL KIRK

"New Ideas" or Old Truth

FRANK S. MEYER

Budgetary Elephantiasis

L. BRENT BOZELL

Articles and Reviews by · · · · · · WILLMOORE KENDALL
WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM · E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN
SAM M. JONES · ABE KALISH · BEN RAY REDMAN

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NATIONAL REVIEW is published weekly, except second and third weeks in August, at Orange, Conn., by National Weekly, Inc. Copyrighted 1957 in the U.S.A. by National Weekly, Inc. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Orange, Conn.

EDITORIAL AND SUBSCRIPTION OFFICES:
211 East 37th St.
New York 16, N.Y.
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RATES, Twenty cents a copy, $7.00 a year, $13.00 for two years. Foreign, $9.00 a year; Canada, $8.00 a year.

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The WEEK

● It all began in the Summit Conference at Geneva, in the sunny days of 1955, at which it was resolved, one by one, to settle outstanding problems between East and West. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was detailed the minor chore of negotiating with Wang Ping-nan of Peiping the release of ten American civilians being illegally held in Red Chinese jails. Ambassador Johnson went to work immediately. Last week he announced that he has scheduled another conference for February 14—his 65th—and that reminded us that the time has come to urge our readers to send him a Second Annual Postcard (care of U.S. Embassy, Geneva)—we urged our readers to send the first a year ago—telling him never say die, Alexis! You've got to give the spirit of Geneva a chance!

● Senators Lehman and Douglas appear to be keenly aware of the same thing NATIONAL REVIEW has been maintaining for several months—that in the next four years the serious political battles will not be between Republicans and Democrats, but between Republicans and Republicans, and Democrats and Democrats. Senator Lehman, retired and clearly not very happy about it, accuses the Democratic Party of following a politically suicidal course when, reaching for party unity, it failed to press for substantive civil rights legislation. He recommended that the new, self-constituted National Advisory Committee bypass congressional Democratic leaders by calling an annual convention, open to all Liberals, at which the paths of righteousness would be publicly illumined. Senator Douglas was less oblique: instead of suggesting means of circumnavigating Democratic conservatives, he simply proposed that they be asked to leave the Democratic Party. Question: where would they go?

● Buried beneath the Budget Message's mountains of words was a sentence that should be more conspicuously framed: "Legislation is recommended to authorize the TVA . . . to finance new generating facilities by the sale of revenue bonds." That is: TVA, *for the purpose of building new steam plants* that private enterprise could and would eagerly construct if permitted to do so, is going to sell its own bonds to the public, outside of the regular structure of the national debt. The President has in the past declared his belief in the doctrine that government should do what the people cannot or will not do for themselves.

He is apparently shifting to the more extended principle that government will also do what the people are not allowed to do for themselves.

● Superficially considered, it would not seem to matter very much which Senate body—the Labor Committee or the McClellan Senate Investigating Subcommittee—pushes the promised probe into labor racketeering. The McClellan group, which claims the right to investigate any labor practices which affect procurement contracts, has one point heavily in its favor: it has already put in several months quietly amassing evidence of racketeering while the Labor Committee has been marking time. But if members of the Teamsters Union, for example, can legitimately refuse to talk before the McClellan Committee on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, then there is an irrefutable argument for letting the Labor Committee take over. As in all jurisdictional disputes, the interest of the public would best be served by making sure that the interloper doesn't get the job. Of course, there is a slight color of hypocrisy when racketeers split hairs about who should investigate them. But even hypocrites have a right to proper procedural protection, and there is no sense in starting an investigation under questionable auspices when the correct procedure is at hand.

● John Steuben, a charter member of the U.S. Communist Party and long one of its leaders in trade union activity, has broken on the issue of the Hungarian revolt. He has called on Marxists the world over to repudiate Moscow's leadership, declaring, "The announcement of the death penalty for Hungarian strikers makes me feel I must cry out against such a crime, particularly when it is done in the name of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.'"

● NATIONAL REVIEW does not know whether ex-President Rómulo Betancourt is telling the truth when he says he broke many years ago with the Communists. But it views with intense suspicion his choice of the present moment—when further development of hemisphere oil resources is a clear strategic necessity—for propounding the two-fold thesis: a) all oil concessions granted to U.S. companies by the present Venezuelan government are illegal; b) no more such concessions should be granted. For the *tertium gaudens*, if this thesis were accepted, would surely be the USSR.

● A columnist in *Time and Tide* writes that a friend of his, doing research on the News Department of the BBC, remarked an interesting terminological evolution between the 11th of November, 1956, and the 13th of November, 1956. By the 10th of November, the army of the Soviet Union had pretty well subdued the opposition, and was once again in control of Hungary. But the world was indignant. Thus, *Time and Tide* reports, "on Saturday, 10 November, the new Hungarian regime was referred to in all BBC broadcasts as 'the Hungarian Puppet Government'; on Sunday, 11 November, it was called 'the Russian-nominated Government'; and on Tuesday, 13 November, it became 'the Hungarian Government.'" The efficient conformity of the broadcasts of BBC accurately anticipated the Western mood.

● Claude Robinson, of the Princeton, N.J., pollster firm of Gallup and Robinson, has started something

For the Record

Democratic Representative John J. Flynt, Jr. of Georgia, has introduced a bill to guarantee the right of jury trial in federal court contempt cases which would apply to "citations for contempt of court which involves acts committed outside the presence of the court by persons not parties to the litigation involved." Flynt referred specifically to the Clinton, Tennessee, contempt cases in which, he says, "A Federal District Court judge took upon himself the power not to interpret the law but rather to make the law." . . . A federal judge in Birmingham has ruled that University of Alabama officials were justified in expelling Autherine Lucy last spring for "making false, defamatory, impertinent and scandalous charges against them." . . . The attempt to repeal the 22nd Amendment, which limits a President to two terms, got down to personalities (Mr. Nixon's specifically) when Democratic Senator Neuberger of Oregon proposed a clause under which, if the office of President is vacated during the first two years of a term, mid-term elections would be held. . . . Senator Bridges has reintroduced his proposed constitutional amendment requiring the President to propose a balanced budget each year and preventing Congress from unbalancing it by increasing spending without a corresponding rise in taxes. . . . The House Committee on Un-American Activities has brought up to date its 1951 report on subversive organizations and publications. Among the new listings, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the National Rosenberg-Sobell committees, the Methodist Federation for Social Action and the Emergency Civil Liberties committees. . . . The Supreme Court will review the claim of 23 Hollywood writers and actors to $51 million in damages on the grounds that they were blacklisted and denied employment for taking the Fifth Amendment or refusing to appear before congressional investigating committees in 1951 and 1952. The California Court of Appeals had dismissed these charges earlier.

called the Princeton Panel, an organization which will devote its resources to the creation of a readable "library of American capitalism." To us, the amazing thing is that the word "capitalism" is used in Mr. Robinson's prospectus without the slightest hint of apology. Mr. Robinson believes positively that capitalism is a good system, far better than any of the current allotropes of collectivism that go by the name of "democratic socialism" or the "middle way" or the "mixed economy." Is Mr. Robinson's unblushing behavior a sign that capitalism has ceased to be a nasty word?

● That native Washington institution, The Cocktail Party, is déclassé, our Society Editor informs us. This is the year of the Well-Appointed Dinner. To break bread with the Certified Republicans one must nowadays have Culture, be a Conversationalist—preferably trilingual; and if one would dine with the principal architect of New Republicanism, Mr. Arthur Larson himself, one must know all about the Vertical Flute, which is what he plays after dinner. We don't know a thing about it, we confess, and so would look, in the salon, as though the steward had dragged us in from the highways and the byways, which, New Republicans seem to agree, is where Old Republicans ought to spend their time.

Having It Both Ways

In his State of the Union message President Eisenhower came out strongly against inflation. Then came the bland White House budget request for $72 billion for fiscal 1958—or, as Mr. Bozell explains in "National Trends" (p. 104), actually for $84 billion. Even $72 billion is a figure which is $3 billion over the sum for fiscal 1957, $6 billion over the amount spent in 1956, and $8 billion above the budget for 1955.

The distance between the President's words about inflation and his act in accepting the $72 billion figure was so pronounced that even those who believe in chronic spending mumbled something about hypocrisy. True, a whopping budget is technically non-inflationary as long as the taxpayer can be milked to sustain it. But it would take only a slight fall-off in the national income, or the Gross National Product, to open a gap between what the government spends in a $72-billion year and what it is able to take in. In adversity the time must come under big budgets when the government, to sustain the taxpayer in his new federally-financed schools, dams and what-not, must turn to inflationary deficits.

Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey caught the point when, in objecting to the budget, he remarked: "I don't think that you can spend yourself rich." If that is the way Mr. Humphrey feels he should resign. But not before calling the President's attention to his 1952 Republican campaign promise "to cut federal spending to something like $60 billion within four years."

Which End of the Telescope?

A revision in the estimates of the rate of Soviet economic growth seems to be under way in both Washington and a number of the civilian research centers. This is a matter of more than abstract importance: American foreign policy is based, to a considerable degree, on the estimates of Soviet military and economic power.

In the past, Soviet economic man has been painted ten feet high. There have, of course, been fractional differences of opinion among the government and academic statisticians, but there has been general agreement on the broad dimensions of Soviet economic power.

This agreement no longer prevails. At the convention of the American Economics Association during the Christmas holidays, Professor Warren Nutter of the University of Virginia announced that the rate of Soviet economic growth was below that of the United States. This view will get a friendly reception from professional economists if for no other reason than that Dr. Nutter's inquiries are being sponsored by the respected and wealthy National Bureau of Economic Research.

There is, accordingly, some prospect that the gross errors of estimate that have been tolerated over the past two decades may be corrected in the years to come. This will create quite a flutter in Washington's bureaucratic hutches—especially in the Central Intelligence Agency, which has a very large number of citizens working on this problem who have come to conclusions altogether different from Dr. Nutter's. Some rabbits, particularly those who have provided CIA Director Allen W. Dulles with the materials that have led to some of his more egregious propaganda errors, will have to seek shelter elsewhere. Mr. Richard Bissell, who forehandedly retired from ECA to CIA after the 1952 election returns came in, may be one of these.

NATIONAL REVIEW, which has always taken a jaundiced view of the Gargantuan theory of the Soviet economy, applauds this evidence of scientific progress. For one of our early issues we managed to obtain an estimate of Soviet economic capability that was within the bounds of reason. ("Can Moscow Deliver?" by Pyrrho, Jan. 11, 1956.) This might be a good moment for the American periodical press to re-examine its performance on this question, and perhaps to correct the impressions that it has so assiduously propagated for twenty years.

For starkest contrast, we remind the *Nation* that on the same date that we printed Pyrrho's article it published a piece by Mr. Peter Wiles claiming that Soviet growth was at a rate that would soon assure a higher Gross National Product than that of the United States. Professor Nutter has now called for an end to this professional nonsense—which is once more repeated by Mr. Calvin Hoover in the January 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

We do not profess to know the precise dimensions of the Soviet economy. We do know that the Soviet subjects are not eating very well; that their diet is even more a matter of bread, potatoes and cabbage than it was in 1912; that their per capita living space is less than half of the 1912 standard; that the shoddy products they are turning out are of a kind in which they can have no pride. Quite apart from lost religious and cultural values, all the sacrifices to "the Soviet experiment" have brought only desperate material privation.

Although the Hungarians and the Poles have been most conspicuous in recent opposition, it is the peoples of the Soviet Union proper who have the oldest record of opposition to the Bolshevik regime, and who are the strongest potential allies of the free world against the Kremlin masters. A large part of this opposition to Communism springs from the knowledge of its failure, in the plainest economic sense, to provide the indispensable requirements for human survival.

NATIONAL REVIEW welcomes the new sophistication of the economics profession. We expect, in the near future, to publish a new assessment of the Soviet economic outlook: one that will take into due account the deepening agricultural crisis, the severe manpower shortage, and the transportation and energy bottlenecks that are ravaging the Soviet economy.

"We Call on All Concerned"

Last week the Hungarian Government calmly announced its plans to try for treason a number of artists and intellectuals who had given aid and comfort to the liberation movement of last October, or else failed to resist that movement with Bolshevik fervor.

Last week, NATIONAL REVIEW received a copy of a most remarkable resolution. It comes from a renowned university—in a neutralist country. That we know of, no college or university in the United States had done anything comparable. The University of Zurich has taken a *corporate* position on the Hungarian situation:

"We [the resolution reads], the Professors, Lectors and Students of the University of Zurich, assembled in the Great Hall, express our indignation and loathing at the inhuman action of the Communist rulers of Russia against the Hungarian efforts toward freedom . . .

"We appeal to all Universities of the Western World to unite in the struggle against the moral, physical and spiritual subjugation of the peoples of Europe and to search for ways and means of liberating them from their shackles . . .

"We are not content with a mere protest and *unite in a solemn vow neither to maintain nor accept any kind of scientific or cultural relations with Soviet Russia,* as long as the Communist rulers of Russia continue to dishonor Hungary or other European nations by brutal repression of spiritual liberty and to rob them of the possibilities of caring for their hereditary culture. *We call on all concerned to exclude Soviet Russia entirely from any economic and ideological relations as well as from those connected with sport.*"

The Resolution, "in the Name of the Academic Senate of the University of Zurich," was signed by the Rector, the dean of the faculty of theology, the dean of the faculty of medicine, the dean of the faculty of

philosophy, the dean of the faculty of law and social sciences, the dean of the faculty of veterinary science, and the president of the Student Council.

The Education of Dwight Eisenhower

From past addresses to Congress, Cabell Phillips, writing in the *New York Times*, has charted President Eisenhower's growing acceptance of the philosophy of federal aid to education.

In 1953 the President made some mild mention of providing for federal aid to state and local school systems where there was "proved need."

In 1954, growing restive, Eisenhower asked Congress for a million dollars to call a national conference on the subject of aid. The following year the ante was really raised: the demand was for $1.1 billion for a big aid-to-education program.

Undaunted by a congressional turndown, the President came back in 1956 with a request for $1.25 billion to be spent in five years, and if it had not been for the anti-segregation amendment to a White House-sponsored bill, Congress might have come through with at least something.

This year, pertinacious as ever in pursuit of his aims, the President is asking for $1.8 billion, to be spent in four years.

Thus, under the "New Republicanism," New Dealism marches on. Mr. Eisenhower's performance in expanding his demands for federal aid to education made us think not so incongruously of Alexander Pope's couplets:

> Vice is a monster of so frightful mien
> As to be hated needs but to be seen;
> Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
> We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

It's Not So Simple

Several months ago, Ed Sullivan asked his vast television audience for expressions of opinion on whether he should present Ingrid Bergman on his program, "Toast of the Town." The results were indecisive—even if one assumes that questions of the kind Mr. Sullivan was in effect posing are settled by submitting them to plebiscitary tests. (A simple majority of Mr. Sullivan's listeners might well vote to put Gypsy Rose Lee's act on the air.) More people said yes than no, but it was no landslide, and rumor has it that there was a trace of sternness in some of the unfavorable letters. The negative vote, radio and TV columnists rushed to conclude, was piled up by spinsters and clerics and prudes; by the sanctimonious pestilents who persist in encumbering art with straitlaced morality.

However that may be, Ed Sullivan dropped the subject—whereupon his principal rival, the versatile Steve Allen, rushed to pick it up. Thus last week, here from Europe for only a few hours to accept an award from the Society of New York Film Critics, Ingrid Bergman appeared before millions of American families on the Steve Allen show.

The foresighted Mr. Allen had prepared a form letter. Whoever wrote him—or writes him—protesting his sponsorship of Miss Bergman will receive the following letter: "The mistake involved here [Miss Bergman mothered another man's son while married to Dr. Lindstrom] is breaking one of the Commandments. If we adopt the principle that anyone violating this particular Commandment should be kept off TV, then I'm afraid that most of our favorite programs would suddenly disappear. I could name fifty popular actresses who are Miss Bergman's moral inferiors. Let's put them all out of business—or leave her alone."

Next question?

Mr. Allen has disposed of the problem involved by saying, a) *Lots of people break "this particular Commandment"* (it is curious that in the same passage in which he is making light of the Commandment in question, an instinctive gentility inhibits him from mentioning it by name!); b) *therefore, let us punish them all alike . . .* (Mr. Allen, implicitly putting forward a claim as voyeurist king of show business, will undertake to supply the names of at least fifty popular actresses equally guilty); or, c) *let's let the matter drop* (the course of action finally adopted by Mr. Allen).

But the problem is not that simple. It is one to vex serious men, a problem seriously befogged by the short-order formulas dished up by a professional impresario looking for self-serving ethical directives.

Christian teaching warns us, sinners all, against casting the first stone. But it is a mistake to assume that those who wrote in to protest the exhibition of Miss Bergman were doing that. Any who were merely acting out of a desire to press a claim to moral superiority are, indeed, guilty of a sin of their own. Many, surely, were not so motivated. And while Christianity enjoins us against showing a hard heart to the repentant sinner, Miss Bergman is not Mary Magdalene: she is explicitly impenitent, cheerfully informing the press that, if she had it to do again, she would, again, commit adultery. One cannot, in short, easily dispose of all the critics of Miss Bergman's appearance.

The point is that once upon a time there was a thing called the public morality. Quite apart from Christian doctrine, certain prescriptions have grown out of a consensus of the people as to the require-

ments of social existence. The prescription in question was not compounded out of superstitution or prudery, but out of highly developed notions as to the essential integrity of the family unit, out of a humanitarian concern over the victimization of innocent children, and out of highly practical ideas as to the social utility of monogamy.

A society has no way of defending its institutions, when they are violated in extra-legal ways, except through the imposition of social sanctions against the violator, or the withholding from him of honors. Not only in a spirit of vindictiveness, or pridefulness or censoriousness, is it possible to protest the appearance of Miss Bergman. One can do so in order to register respect for the institution she made light of, sympathy for those whose lives have been ravaged by that institution's violators, and solidarity with the overwhelming majority who, Mr. Allen's insinuations notwithstanding, affirm by word and deed the sanctity of the marriage contract.

Did CIA Take the Senate?

Harper & Brothers have lately published a book entitled *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy,* which turns out to be one of the collective products of the feverishly active Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (A mimeographed version, adroitly built up as the latest scientific word on foreign policy, has circulated widely in Washington over the last year.) It calls, in familiar Bowlesian tones, for a permanent foreign aid program to give underdeveloped nations a "sense of progress"—without regard, of course, to U.S. political or strategic interests. In and of itself, therefore, it would not be worth a second thought. But hear us further:

The Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate paid the Center for International Studies $200,000 for producing *Proposal,* which suggests Mystery Number One, namely: How could all those dollars conceivably have been used up in writing a piece that a skillful hack could have turned out in a couple of months (and, for a thousand dollar advance, *would* have). Do those MIT digital computers eat greenbacks for breakfast?

But Mystery Number Two is even more fascinating. The Center for International Studies, according to persistent rumor, was set up and financed for the most part by the Central Intelligence Agency (through what is called a "cut-out"). Unless this rumor is false, we have the following circle on our hands:

1) The Senate votes funds to CIA. 2) CIA, defying a law (that prohibits CIA's operating within the United States), uses some of the funds to create a domestic research institution, the MIT Center, and that Center regularly publishes slanted books and articles, advocating partisan policies, for the U.S. market. 3) The Center, putting itself forward as a bona fide scientific outfit, asks a Senate committee to give it further funds with which to conduct a study of foreign aid problems. 4) the Senate Committee agrees. 5) The MIT Center obliges with a propaganda brochure.

Gentlemen of the Foreign Relations Committee, it looks to us as if you have been conned. Why not a few pertinent questions to Professors Max Millikan and W. W. Rostow, who authored the brochure, and to their backers?

The Barrel's Bottom

Columbia University has created a "special faculty council" to study the "problems facing society as a result of the development of atomic energy"; and the press release accompanying the announcement shows both that the project is in good hands and that a lot of hard thinking has gone into the devising of it. One member of the council, for instance, is our old friend, Professor Phil Jessup, who demonstrated his capacity to see deeply into difficult problems way back in IPR days; besides which such distinguished academic disciplines as International Relations, Journalism and Business—along with upstarts like Physics, Engineering, Medicine, Philosophy and Law—are to be represented in its bosom.

We are going, proclaims Dr. Jessup with his unfailing gift of phrase, "to study this atomic age like one of the diamond cutters that we read about . . . study the problems for a time to decide how to break them up into pieces that can be handled." Never before, declares another councillor in effect, has a new source of energy appeared so suddenly. "The big problem," avers still another, "is something we call verification. That is, how do you find out how the other Government is living up to the terms of the agreement? Also, we want to know how an atomic armament agreement might affect international and domestic law and the American Constitution [it should be junked, of course]."

We have been hearing for some time of the frantic search for "projects" on which to spend the enormous sums now available for academic research. The news from Columbia is, therefore, reassuring. This project could have come from nowhere save the bottom of the barrel; there is very little left.

Along with all who have been inspirited by his genius, we mourn the death of Arturo Toscanini. Next week, Mr. Schlamm will write an appreciation of the Maestro in his column.

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

Budgetary Elephantiasis

One way of telling whether the Eisenhower Administration has lived up to the 1952 campaign promises to "reverse the trend toward statism" is to consult the spokesmen for the New Republicanism: you are sure to be told that it has, and you will probably be referred to the "philosophical differences" between the Fair Deal and the Eisenhower Administration to prove the point. Another way is to consult the record. There are a number of yardsticks by which the record can be measured, but the one that will get you to the heart of the matter fastest, with maximum justice to all concerned, is this: How much of the people's wealth is expropriated and distributed by the State under the Eisenhower Administration, as compared with what was done under the Truman Administration—and for what purposes? The President's Budget Message to Congress for the fiscal year 1958 is worth examining from this point of view.

Mr. Eisenhower proposes that the federal government spend $84 billion between July 1, 1957 and July 1, 1958 —a record high since World War II, *i.e.*, more even than was spent during the Korean War years. The President's budget figure of $71.8 billion is, let us note, misleading: to that figure must be added the anticipated expenditures from so-called "trust funds" which are financed, in the main, by special payroll and excise taxes, and are therefore not included in the regular budget. In fiscal 1958, $10.5 billion will be paid out of trust funds for old age and survivors' insurance, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, railroad employees retirement and federal employees retirement. And $1.7 billion will be paid out of the highway trust fund from taxes on motor fuels, tires and vehicles that were levied by the Federal Highway Act last year.

In order to compare present domestic spending with that of past years, let us simply note, and thenceforth exclude from this analysis, the proposed expenditures for defense and foreign policy purposes: approximately $45.8 billion is being asked to finance the U.S. defense establishment, foreign military and economic aid programs, propaganda, and related activities.

Let us also exclude the $7.4 billion allotted by the Eisenhower budget for interest payments on the national debt. This enormous outlay, incidentally, continues to grow (it is up $100 million over last year) despite small reductions in the debt principal in the last three years. The reason: the Eisenhower Administration's anti-inflationary "tight money" policy has the peripheral inflationary effect of increasing the interest rates the government must pay to refinance its matured obligations. The increase in this item, in other words, cannot be laid to profligate or welfarist tendencies on the part of the Administration.

The President's budget thus adjusted leaves roughly $30.9 billion that the Eisenhower Administration proposes to spend on the federal government's domestic programs in the coming year. If we make corresponding adjustments of past budgets, the record of federal spending over a ten-year period is as follows:

Fiscal Year	Domestic Spending (in billions)[1]
1949 (Truman)	17.6
1950 (Truman)	19.5
1951 (Truman)	15.2
1952 (Truman)	16.5
1953 (Truman)	19.7
1954 (Eisenhower)	18.7
1955 (Eisenhower)	22.8
1956 (Eisenhower)	25.3
1957 (Eisenhower)	28.7
1958 (Eisenhower)	30.9

[1]The 1957 and 1958 figures are estimates; the figures for preceding years represent actual expenditures.

The significance of this spending record is pretty much self-evident. If the extent of the government's control over the nation's wealth-distributing process is a valid measure of statism, then there can be very little question about the direction in which the "trend" is going. The Eisenhower Administration has not only failed to reverse the trend; it has kept it moving forward, *and at a progressively accelerated rate.* Mr. Eisenhower, to be sure, made a good beginning: in his first year, the government spent a billion dollars less than it did in Harry Truman's last year. But by his second year, Mr. Eisenhower's budget was larger than Mr. Truman's last and largest one; and by his fifth year, it was $11 billion, or 56 per cent, larger than the 1953 Truman budget!

Another way of looking at it is that after five years in office, the Eisenhower Administration will have spent *in toto* $126.4 billion, for domestic purposes, as compared with $88.5 billion spent by the Truman Administration during its last five years.

Some allowance, of course, must be made for population increase—*i.e.*, the same old welfare program will obviously cost more if there are more people to be cared for. But population advances do not begin to account for the spending advances. Between fiscal 1953 and fiscal 1958, the U.S. population will have increased by roughly 9 per cent—as compared with the 56 per cent increase in federal expenditures. Nor does it help, in this case, to cite the variable value of the dollar. Inflation, which was rampant in the immediate postwar period, tapered off during the last years of the Truman Administration and has been negligible in the Eisenhower era. True, present price movements indicate a possible decrease in dollar value by the time the 1958 budget goes into effect. But the President's Budget Message proposals were advanced clearly on the assumption that the Administration will be able to hold the line.

Topping the Democrats

Finally, this observation seems pertinent: one often hears that *some* increase in spending must be expected, no matter who is in power, and that if the Democrats, instead of the Republicans, had been in office during the past five years, we would be saddled with even bigger budgets. Therefore, the argument runs, we

should be grateful for the small blessings we have. This may be so; but if a party's propensity to increase spending from year to year can be assessed by what it has actually done in the past, the argument is cruelly unjust to the Democrats. As a matter of record the Democratic Party, during its last five years in office, increased domestic spending at the rate of half a billion a year. While the Republican Party during the past five years has increased domestic spending at the rate of $2.6 billion a year.

The President's new budget reflects a steady increase in spending in practically every area of government activity. Take, for example, the "Labor and Welfare" category. Here Mr. Eisenhower proposes to spend $3.5 billion as compared with $2.4 billion in the 1953 Truman budget. Roughly half of this amount, $1.7 billion, goes into federal matching funds for state "public assistance," *i.e.*, relief programs—as against $1.3 billion in the 1953 budget. Funds for labor employment services, training programs and grants to states for unemployment compensation come to $400 million as compared with $281 million in the last Truman budget. Five hundred and thirty-three million is allotted to federal aid to education, as against $288 million in 1953. Public health projects, mainly medical research and hospital construction, will absorb $606 million, as against $318 million in 1953. The smaller items under "Labor and Welfare" also reflect increases, although somewhat lesser ones.

A little over a third of the government's domestic spending will be for benefit payments and administrative expenses under various social insurance and retirement programs. Here is the breakdown: $7.4 billion for old age and survivors' insurance (Social Security), as against $2.8 billion in Truman's last year; $1.5 billion for unemployment insurance, as against one billion in fiscal 1953; $739 million in railroad retirement benefits, as against $465 million in 1953; $598 million in federal employees' retirement benefits, as against $363 million in 1953; $313 million to be paid out in federal disability insurance benefits, a program inaugurated under the Eisenhower Administration last year.

Part of these increases can be explained, of course, by the increasing number of persons who are getting old and retiring. But only part of them. Let us remember that it is in the field of income insurance that the New Republicanism has been most anxious to prove its concern for "the people"—with the result that under the Eisenhower Administration coverage has been greatly broadened, eligibility ages reduced and benefits increased.

Farm Subsidies

Mr. Eisenhower plans to spend a cool five billion in various subsidies to the nation's agricultural community. This figure compares with $2.9 billion spent under Harry Truman's last budget. It is, of course, true that the Eisenhower Administration inherited the "farm problem" from previous Democratic Administrations which had encouraged overexpansion of the agricultural economy. But it is also true that the Eisenhower Administration has failed utterly to solve the problem, and that it will go on failing for as long as it is prepared to guarantee the income of everyone who wants to till the soil. Mr. Eisenhower's soil bank plan will probably reduce the surpluses somewhat, but his budget proposals seem to establish that most of what is saved in reduced price supports for over-production is promptly lost again in compensatory payments for taking lands out of production. In fiscal 1956, the price support program cost $3.5 billion; in fiscal 1958, the price support program will cost only $1.9 billion. But to this must be added $1.3 billion in soil bank payments.

Other items in the agricultural budget show these increases over Mr. Truman's 1953 budget: financing of farm ownership and operation, from $109 million to $271 million; financing of rural electrification and rural telephones, from $239 million to $265 million; conservation (exclusive of soil bank payments), from $317 million to $366 million; research and agricultural services, from $145 million to $280 million.

Another five billion, under the new budget, is slated for veterans. The figure in Mr. Truman's last year was $4.3 billion. The lion's share of the veterans' budget—$3.1 billion in 1958 and $2.4 billion in 1953—is consumed by compensation benefits for disabilities and deaths resulting from service, and by pensions paid for disabilities incurred after service. While compensation benefits have been on the increase since World War II, they are expected to stabilize in 1958 at $1.9 billion, and start declining several years thereafter.

The outlook is not so bright with respect to pensions, which will cost around $1.2 billion in 1958. Mr. Eisenhower noted in his budget message that "because many of the non-service-connected ailments accepted as establishing eligibility for pensions are normally associated with advancing age, the pension rolls will continue to grow until near the end of this century as veterans grow older and as more survivors become eligible." Let us note another reason for the increased cost of veterans' pensions (the very existence of which is an affront to both logic and equity anyway): in 1954 the Eighty-third Congress increased veterans' pensions by 5 per cent at the instance of the Eisenhower Administration.

Natural Resources

Expenditures on natural resources are placed at $1.5 billion, an increase of $60 million over the 1953 Truman budget. Eisenhower plans to spend $164 million less than Truman on power, irrigation and flood-control projects; but that cutback is more than offset by increased funds asked for such items as recreational parks and conservation of forests, fish and wildlife.

To round out the comparison of major items in the 1958 and 1953 budgets: Eisenhower is planning to spend $76 million less for housing programs than Truman got, but $105 million more for aid to business; $61 million more for disaster programs, $1.2 billion more for highway construction.

All of which suggests that Republican candidates, as a point of elemental decency, should hereafter refrain from lambasting the opposition party for favoring the welfare state—either that, or be prepared to repudiate the record of their own party. Oh, and another thing—may they please give up that canard about what Franklin Roosevelt did after promising to cut government spending?

from WASHINGTON *straight*

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

"With the Consent of the Governed"

Of course you have all heard or read or seen the super Field Day we had here on January 21. It was a great celebration. Some one or several ghosts wrote a speech for Mr. Eisenhower. He delivered it quite well although no one will ever accuse him of being a Daniel Webster or a Demosthenes, even with a mouth full of pebbles.

But the speeches and the pro forma ceremonies were merely incidental. The parade was swell. And the weather—Mr. Eisenhower's luck has become a national superstition—was fair with occasional sunshine. Nobody froze to the grandstand seats, nobody got snowed under. Cecil B. De Mille couldn't have done it better. The elephants were wonderful. And the bands played on. "The glory that was Greece" was in absentia, but the "grandeur that was Rome" was at its grandest. It was Mardi Gras; it was the Tournament of Roses; it was *veni, vidi, vici,* with the unnoticed omission of captives bound to Ike's chariot wheels.

The idealism of Mr. Eisenhower was transcendent. Not only did he picture the lion lying down with the lamb, but he also gave the impression that the crocodile could be converted in due time—to become a lettuce eater.

As you know, there were four balls at $15 per person. You had to know people of importance to attain the privilege of getting into one of these mass-messes. Some 9,000 enthusiasts attended the ball in the Armory. Each was rewarded with two ounces of domestic champagne in a punch cup. Mr. Eisenhower didn't want the implication of a liquored assembly that bottles and conventional glasses might convey.

All that Hollywood and Madison Avenue and the press and radio and TV could do was done well. It was a great *show.* It was dreamlike: the eve of Waterloo, the Pyrrhic victory, the mouthing of words that once had meaning, the crowd, the crush, the enormity of a nation's stupefaction, its apparent unawareness that Pied Pipers (with or without malice) were leading the dance to the abyss. There was no new song although the traditional hymns — "America," "The Star-Spangled Banner," "America the Beautiful," and the "Battle Hymn of the Republic"—were accorded a once over lightly.

It was all beautiful and wonderful and progressive and banal. I guess people will call me a louse or a misanthrope, or whatever occurs to them, because I don't see it their way. But I thought, during the celebration, of the residents of Pompeii who could have picked up their Lares and Penates and moved when Vesuvius started to spout its red-hot ash. They were warned (even as you and I). But maybe there were hucksters and politicians in Pompeii who said the volcano only had a belly-ache and was rumbling its indigestion. No need to be worried. The results of that "security" have been intensely interesting to archaeologists and tourists—and a matter of indifference to the Pompeians who got burned alive.

Mr. Eisenhower obviously means well. He has all the virtues of mediocrity. He has survived serious illnesses and defeated a fifth-rate opponent at the polls. All Hail!

But it takes rose-colored glasses of the rosiest hue to see the world as Mr. Eisenhower sees it, or to accept his none too lucid concepts of foreign policy. Do we, for example, pat the little cobra, or smash its death-dealing fangs? Mr. Eisenhower seems betwixt and between, ending in a compromise which sends the cobra a polite warning and makes a tea-for-two rendezvous with him.

We have had the honeymoon. And the champagne and the glamour. And in the offing are the homespun or foreign-born facts of life. President Eisenhower's program for the Middle East will get by, as previously noted, because Congress is in the middle of a muddle, and it is easier to "go along" than to resist. But, despite the euphoric atmosphere of the Inauguration, the road ahead is scarcely a bed of roses. The Inauguration ceremonies had everything except inspiration.

I have seen many inaugurations, and the reporter takes the fat with the lean, but I have searched my memory and a number of books, and I have never found anything like this. What occasioned the jubilance? What were we celebrating? The Korean truce? The partition of Indochina? The Spirit of Geneva? Suez? The collapse of NATO? The impotence of UN? The desperation of Hungary? The destruction of Britain and France as competent allies? The rise of Nasser? The entente of Peiping and Moscow? The steady spread of Red infiltration, like the drip of an ink bottle over the surface of the world?

Everyone on radio and television is inviting me to trade in my car. My car runs all right but I would like to trade in Mr. Eisenhower for Senator Knowland. Of course, that's only a somewhat remote hope, but it's not too early to begin trying.

"New Ideas" or Old Truth

In the continued debate over Mr. Burnham's proposal that Central Europe be neutralized, Mr. Meyer examines its ideological premises

FRANK S. MEYER

James Burnham's proposals for a new strategy for American foreign policy, as developed in his column, "The Third World War," and in his article, "Liberation—What Next?", are submitted for debate "between men who share," to quote the NATIONAL REVIEW editorial opening this discussion, "the relevant fundamental assumptions: that coexistence is immoral, undesirable, and, in the long run, impossible; that we are dealing with an implacable enemy whose revolutionary fervor burns as hot as ever, and whose designs on the men of the West, and their institutions, remain the same."

1. Mr. Burnham's Assumptions

That Mr. Burnham arrives at foreign policy proposals so sharply different from those which others of us derive from the same assumptions, would indicate that further assumptions, additional to those we share in common, underlie his thinking. His proposals ("reunification of Germany; negotiation of the eastern German boundary; withdrawal of all occupation [foreign] troops from all of Central and Eastern Europe; military neutralization of the entire area") are of the kind that NATIONAL REVIEW and Mr. Burnham himself have continuously and vehemently criticized. Neither at first sight, nor with further and deeper examination, have I found any reason to believe that recent events have so radically changed the situation as to justify the belief that a policy of withdrawal is any less dangerous this year than last year. If anything, the difficulties in which the Soviet empire finds itself should give greater rewards to a forward policy now than ever. But Mr. Schlamm has written a detailed and, in my opinion, convincing criticism of the content of Mr. Burnham's proposals, and I do not wish to repeat or to elaborate his arguments.

I should like rather to examine the special assumptions, additional to the stock we hold in common, which have made it possible for the author of *The Struggle for the World* and *Containment or Liberation?* to propose a policy of this sort. These assumptions would seem to be two in number, each modifying one of the basic assumptions of NATIONAL REVIEW.

The recognition of the immorality, undesirability, and eventual impossibility of coexistence, he conditions by the proposition that "the Eisenhower axioms" must be accepted (absolutely, it would seem) as part of "the reality of our time," upon which any strategic proposals must be based. Secondly, the proposition that Communism remains Communism is conditioned by a further assumption that Communism has suffered a "colossal defeat" and is in such straits as a result that it *is* capable of "changing"; that it can confidently be expected to dissolve from the effect of its own internal stresses, if only the present American and the potential German pressure is released; and that the Communist High Command is caught in such contradictions that it must willy-nilly follow a policy (if only we do withdraw) which will inevitably bring about such a dissolution.

These two assumptions, I should like to discuss in order.

2. The Axioms of Mr. Eisenhower

First, therefore: is it possible to develop a strategy compatible with the basic axioms of NATIONAL REVIEW's policy which at the same time stays within the limits of "the Eisenhower axioms"? Mr. Burnham does not explain why it is now necessary to accept these limitations in our thinking, when it was not necessary so to do half a year ago. Since, however, he stresses as the proximate cause of his change of attitude that the events of these few months, particularly the events in Hungary and Poland, have created a new situation, it may be assumed that this is the reason for now taking into account limitations that previously had to be ignored by "hard anti-Communists" in their proposals for foreign policy.

Undoubtedly, something *has* happened in these months. President Eisenhower's betrayal of our allies on this side of the Iron Curtain at Suez, and of our allies on the other side of the Iron Curtain in Hungary, has made clearer than ever before the extent and depth of the bankruptcy of his policy. It is one thing to know logically, in the abstract, as it were, what the objective meaning of a policy is; it is another to see it in living reality. What Asia learned in the last decade, Europe has learned this past year: the rhetoric of our foreign policy contains a reality that is unbelievable until it takes material form. The Hungarian slaughter, the apotheosis of Nasser, the humiliation of Britain and Eden, the surrender of the Mideast to the Soviet Union (the Eisenhower Doctrine is as effective as a sledge-hammer against termites)—these are the realities of our foreign policy of 1957.

Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee learned the same lesson a little earlier. It is a very simple lesson: the "axiomatic structure" upon which American foreign policy is based is surrender, surrender, and again surrender. Nor is this surprising; it is the logical outcome of Mr. Eisenhower's first axiom: war is unthinkable. For, if war is unthinkable in a world in which there exists a rival power, bent upon domination of the world, to whom war *is* thinkable, surrender is the only possible out-

come. The only question is: how long will it take to reach the point of final surrender; how much have we got in the sled to throw to the wolves to slow them up?

There can be no mistake about it: unless we take a stance firmly founded upon a willingness to risk war in defense of truth and freedom, and make it clear to the world that we are prepared to take that risk, no strategy for victory can be constructed. Force, actual or potential, is the only arbiter between those who hold no intrinsic truths in common.

It is the daily coin of those who live within the axiomatic structure of the Establishment that "you cannot fight ideas with bayonets." But there are times when there is no mutually accepted ground upon which ideas can be fought with ideas, when evil ideas backed up with force cannot be fought with anything but force. The alternative is surrender to them. Stalemate is ruled out if, as in our situation, the enemy is inspired by a dynamic Gnostic conviction of his mission to transform the world.

To put it bluntly, there are only two alternatives: the destruction of Communism or the destruction of the United States and of Western civilization. This is, for the purpose of founding a strategy, the decisive center of the "realities of our time." The sense in which the "Eisenhower axiomatic structure" can be considered a "reality of our time" is, compared to this, Pickwickian. Mr. Burnham challenges us to advance a "new idea" that was not thought of before 1949, an "alternative to his proposals" that will be "realistic." To that challenge I can only answer that the basic world situation has not changed since 1949.

That situation is the essence of reality. "The axiomatic structure" upon which our policy has been based is a "reality" only in the sense that it is the efflorescence of external terrorization and internal confusion of purpose. It is impossible to fight Communism without fighting to change that axiomatic structure. This, therefore, is the indispensable foundation of any foreign-policy program: to fight against that axiomatic structure, to educate and to mobilize the forces to change it.

This is high among the aims to which NATIONAL REVIEW is dedicated; but there cannot be, unless by pure chance, a policy (with the beauty of the perpetual-motion gimmick) that will at one and the same time satisfy both the axioms upon which NATIONAL REVIEW was founded and the axioms of our Establishment. Unless, therefore, Mr. Burnham's proposals are of the happy and miraculous character that by chance can reflect the demands of contradictory sets of policies, they must reflect the demands of the one or the other. *Prima facie,* being of the nature of détente, of withdrawal, they reflect the demands of the Eisenhower axiomatic structure. The burden of proof to the contrary is heavily upon Mr. Burnham. What evidence does he bring forward to prove that they represent that happy conjunction of opposing principles which he maintains has become the case?

3. *The Dissolution of Communism?*

This brings us to his second assumption. Is the Soviet empire in such case that it will dissolve precisely if we act as the Eisenhower axioms dictate? Mr. Burnham's case rests (if the Eisenhower axioms and the NATIONAL REVIEW axioms are both to be respected) upon the judgment that it is in such case.

I shall not repeat what I have written previously in NATIONAL REVIEW to confute that judgment. I shall only say that if it is indeed—which I deeply doubt—in such a posture of weakness, now is the time to increase not decrease our pressure, to compound not simplify its difficulties, to take advantage of the "new fluidity" to move toward its destruction, not to help it stabilize, relying upon the questionable possibility of its dying of its own contradictions. If it is not, if it is simply having difficulties which it can overcome, as it has overcome previous difficulties, then also we should increase the pressure to make its solutions more difficult, to force it back in the moment of its embarrassment, to move steadfastly toward the showdown.

Mr. Burnham gambles everything, in his effort to find a happy meeting ground for the axioms of NATIONAL REVIEW and the axioms of Eisenhower and Dulles, upon the assumption that, left to itself, Communism will gradually dissipate and go away. But any strategical proposal must be prepared for the least favorable estimate of the enemy's forces as for the most favorable. Any strategy based upon reality (pre-1949 or post-1949) must take account of that factor which is the ideological disposition of the enemy. His capabilities we have no reason to scorn after his conquest of half the world and neutralization of half the rest. When disposition and capability are so combined, a Hungarian rising, that before our eyes is being reduced with Bolshevik single-mindedness (totally unaffected by the moral indignation of the world, unbacked by force) cannot change our fundamental estimate of the strength of the enemy. It proves only that *if we struck,* we should have allies.

A policy of withdrawal, congenial though it may be to the outlook of the current Administration, has enormous dangers if Mr. Burnham's second assumption (the deep inner weakness of the Soviet regime) is untrue. If it is true, it promises no gains that would not be magnified a hundred times by a policy of aggressive pressure.

Furthermore, considering the conditions under which foreign policy has perforce to be developed where a mass electorate is involved, concrete strategical proposals of a large scale inevitably are associated with the production of corresponding moods in the nation. Proposals of withdrawal can only strengthen the pacifism and irresponsibility which the Eisenhower Administration has already done so much to develop. Mr. Burnham's proposals, if adopted in the present atmosphere of pacifism, UN-ism, and American subvention of world socialism, could only weaken our military posture while doing nothing to make our immense foreign expenditures less fruitless than they have been.

There can be, in short, no contrived substitute for the hard choices which we face. It is not possible to create a policy that both satisfies the hopes of an Eisenhower dream of renunciation of war, reliance upon the UN, victory without sacrifice, and simultaneously recognizes, as NATIONAL REVIEW has done, the harsh reality of the irrepressible conflict between the aims of armed Communism and the survival of our civilization and our values.

The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

New Mass Medium

James Reston on the President's inaugural address (*New York Times,* January 22, 1957): "The speech was noble, eloquent, and generous . . . It proclaimed, indeed, a kind of new deal for the undernourished nations of the earth, going well beyond the domestic New and Fair-Deals of his two immediate predecessors in the White House. . . . No American President of this century ever uttered a more stirring dedication to the principles of internationalism. . . . He offered help, without strings, to all nations in need or peril that asked for it."

Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Democrat, as quoted in the *Times* (same day): "The President set forth goals and objectives with which every American will agree. . . . Our task is to find the means that will achieve those ends."

Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat, is indirectly quoted to the same effect.

Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican, as indirectly quoted in the *Times* (same day):" . . . the President . . . struck 'exactly the right note.' Senator Javits said he was particularly impressed with the President's emphasis on economic help to nations eager to attain or retain freedom."

Walter Lippmann, in the *New York Herald Tribune* (same day): "The basic problems of the budget are on the one hand inflation and on the other how to finance the welfare measures of what *used to be called the New Deal and what is now called the New Republicanism.*"

(Neither the *Times* nor the *Herald Tribune* seems to have been able to elicit comment from any Senator whose name figures in the history of the Republican Party—except, of course, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin. Senator Wiley, the *Herald Tribune* reports, "asserted the President laid it right on the line" in his speech, "not only to the American people but to the world.")

There are three points to grasp here:

—the extent to which the address embodies the basic emphases of the Liberal Line, as we have observed it in this space over the past fourteen months (the President ceases now to be a mere captive of the Liberals, and becomes a mass medium of the Liberal Propaganda Machine);

—the machine's angling of the "news" about the address: it merely enunciates what *everybody* believes;

—the concession, by leading pundits like Reston and Lippmann, of NATIONAL REVIEW's continuing insistence that "progressive conservatism" is not only not conservative but actually to the Left, on many important issues, of the New and Fair Deals.

But our proper business here is with the first of the three—that is, with spotting the nakedly Liberal-lining passages in the address, and identifying the long-term machine operations that they are clearly calculated to forward (italics all added):

1. *Operation Levelling-to-Assuage-Our-Guilt-about-Our-Riches*: "We live in a land of plenty. . . . In too much of the world there is want, discord, danger . . . one-third of mankind has entered upon an historic struggle . . . for freedom from grinding poverty."

2. *Operation Levelling-Via-Ever-Greater-Foreign Aid*: "We must use our skills and knowledge and, at times, our substance, to help others rise from misery, however far the scene of suffering may be from our shores . . . *wherever in the world a people knows desperate want.*"

3. *Operation Fie-on-Those-Who-Resist-Change*: ". . . across all the globe there harshly flow the winds of change. And we—though fortunate be our lot—know that we can never turn our backs to them."

4. *Operation Communism - Is - Wicked*: "The designs of . . . [Communist] power, dark in purpose, are clear in practice. It strives to seal forever the fate of those it has enslaved. It strives to break the ties that unite the free."

5. *Operation UN-Will-Solve-the-Problem*: ". . . in [UN] . . . rests the best hope of our age for the assertion of that law by which all nations may live in dignity."

6. *Operation Levelling-to-Beat-the-Communists:* "and [Communism] . . . strives to capture—to exploit for its own greater power—all forces of change in the world, especially the needs of the hungry and the hopes of the oppressed."

7. *Operation Glorify-But-Don't-Emulate - the - Freedom - Fighters*: "Through the night of their bondage, the unconquerable will of heroes has struck with the swift, sharp thrust of lightning. Budapest . . . is a new shining symbol of man's yearning to be free."

8. *Operation Number-One-Priority-for-Peace*: ". . . we declare our firm and fixed purpose—the building of . . . peace. . . . We seek peace . . . peace is the climate of freedom . . . peace may be the only climate possible for human life itself."

9. *Operation Get-Ready-Not-to-Fight-but-to-Pay-Higher-Taxes*: "To proclaim [peace] . . . is easy. To serve it will be hard. . . . Splendid as can be the blessings of . . . peace, *high will be its cost*: in *toil* patiently sustained, in *help* honorably given, in *sacrifice* calmly borne."

10. *Operation Levelling - We - Brought - the - Need - for - It - on - Ourselves:* ". . . the American story of material progress has helped excite the longing of all needy peoples. . . . These hopes that we have helped to inspire, we can help to fulfill."

11. *Operation No-Political-Strings-on-Foreign-Aid*: ". . . we no more seek to buy their sovereignty than we would sell our own. . . . We seek neither their military alliance nor *any artificial imitation of our society.*"

12. *Operation Wish-Fulfillment-on-U.S.-USSR-Relations*: "We honor the people of Russia. . . . We wish them success in their demands for more intellectual freedom, greater security before their own laws, fuller enjoyment of the rewards of their own toil. For as such things may come to pass, the *more* certain will be . . . the day when our peoples may freely meet in friendship." But only the *more* certain. It is certain anyway.

Letter from Paris

E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Gasoline rationing was suspended during the holiday period so that the traffic was perfectly normal; which means that Parisian rush hours presented the usual problems. Yet, since the Frenchman is an extrovert and simply loves to supplement the numerous political posters with scribbled commentaries, the houses, walls and embankments show the depth of the change which has taken place since the Hungarian Revolution.

For several days I could not detect a single inscription revealing a leftist or pro-Communist tendency. "Long live Hungary!" "Long live the Hungarian Martyrs!" (which they tragically failed to do), "Dissolution of the Communist Party of France!"—these are some of the slogans which tell us more than the subtlest analyses of newspapermen. The "street," in Paris, seemingly belongs no longer to the Communists. The turning point was the student attack against the offices of *Humanité*, an event unthinkable before October 1956.

The French non-Communist Left and the neutralists have quite a headache. They have made attempts to *talk* the Hungarian Revolution apart. I was aware of this at one of those typically Parisian meetings held in a bookstore at night, with a famous French philosopher presiding.

Two outstanding French journalists, both clever and "left-of-center," both eye-witnesses of the revolution in Budapest, gave accounts and made critical remarks. They were certain that the "fascism of the Horthy system" had no chance of coming back, that Cardinal Mindszenty's speech had been "ill-timed," and that the whole thing would never have happened if the Russians had not installed a regime of truly colonial exploitation, instead of giving the Hungarians genuine "national" socialism and a higher living standard. It was, in short, the economic situation which had made the Hungarians rise.

The speakers were furiously contradicted by three Hungarian students who had fought in the rebellion and who considered Mindszenty, "although a Suabian," the greatest living Hungarian. The real reason for their heroism, they insisted, was the total absence of liberty. "Our comrades died for Hungary and liberty, not for calories." It was quite a lesson for the Frenchmen present.

France has problems of her own, and while the vast majority hotly defends the overseas policies of the government—Suez and all that—a minority thinks that the British misguided them and that the Americans let them down. This sentiment in the old anti-Anglo-Saxon tradition is in itself no tragedy. It facilitates the commendable Franco-German *rapprochement*. Mollet has received a vote of confidence, and the Chamber of Deputies is engaged in interesting debates about the Common European Market and Euratom. (The *Bundestag* in Bonn will face the same problems, which have increased in urgency because of the Soviet threat and the dire necessity to establish "Europe.")

All this does not mean that the Mollet Government will last forever or that the French crisis has been solved. It has not. Algeria will probably cease to be an integral part of France, and yet France simply cannot give up an area where almost two million French settlers live: their return would provide Metropolitan France with political dynamite. These Frenchmen, tough, very prolific, and politically far on the right, would be far more dangerous than the *Poujadistes* (who are definitely losing momentum). Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria has truly been *made* by the French. It is, moreover, the natural avenue from the French motherland, via the Sahara, to a Gallicized West and Central Africa. And the Sahara is also extremely rich in oil deposits. Here are domains which France cannot give up.

The basic problem of French political life is the void that prevails elsewhere in Europe: no institution, no form of government, no political order has maintained its prestige, its honor, or its magnetic glamour. In the subway one still can see the remnants of posters issued by the Soudé Paint Manufacturing Company. They feature three tall Mariannes, and a small one strutting along, and the text reads: "The Republics come and go, but Soudé Paints last forever." Almost nobody (or so the sentiments indicate) would lay down his life for the Fourth Republic.

The forms of the demise of the parliamentary Republic are a matter of constant discussion among intelligent Frenchmen. There is a consensus in informed circles to the effect that Charles de Gaulle still has a future. Mendès-France, who has a flair for future developments, has tightened his connections with the General. De Gaulle has staged a comeback through the back door of historiography, on a high literary level—an avenue to political reincarnation difficult to imagine West of France.

Can the Comte de Paris, too, step into a vacuum created by the eventual collapse of the present regime? The Bourbon candidate for the French throne returned from exile after invoking the Human Rights stipulation of the United Nations. His presence is strongly felt all over France, and he is famous for his excellent connections with the Left. (He is, after all, an Orléans, a descendant of the *Roi Citoyen*.) Pictures of his children fill the illustrated weeklies, and his articles are read in the Chamber of Deputies. Still, in the next big crisis De Gaulle would have a better chance, precisely because a military dictatorship has less permanence than a monarchy. Permanence is what the French need as desperately as they dread it.

What Is the Republic?

Dr. Kirk defends the traditional values of the Republic against the collectivists who would reduce humanity to identical servants of the State

RUSSELL KIRK

Conservatism is not an ideology; but conservatism does possess a body of principles, a framework of concepts which endures after the controversies of the hour have faded out of memory. One of the most important of those concepts is the idea of the Republic.

The word "republic" means public things, the commonwealth, the general welfare as expressed in political forms. The idea of the Republic lies at the root of American conservative thought. We have not known monarchy since 1776, and we always have been suspicious of "pure democracy"—that is, of government by the masses, without constitutional checks, protection for minorities, and representative institutions. Our government, as Calhoun said, "is, of course, a Republic, a constitutional democracy, in contradistinction to an absolute democracy; and . . . the theory which regards it as a government of the mere numerical majority rests on a gross and groundless misconception."

The purpose of the collectivistic state is to abolish classes, voluntary associations, and private rights, swallowing all these in the blur of the "general will" and absolute equality of condition—equality, that is, of everyone except the administrators of the state. The purpose of our Republic, on the contrary, has been to reconcile classes, protect voluntary associations, and nourish private rights. We do not recognize any "general will," but only the opinions of private citizens and legitimate groups. We do not seek equality of condition, but only equality of legal rights—the classical principle of justice, "to each his own."

We never have fallen, most of us, into the error that "commonwealth" means "collectivism." Our common freedom and our common prosperity have been nurtured by a salutary neglect of the notion of an absolute central sovereignty. This original conservative cast of our politics has not departed from among us. Unenchanted by the fallacy that the will of the majority is the will of God, we have sustained a Republic marked by sound security against the will and the appetite of temporary and irresponsible majorities.

Conservatives Rebuild

Our Republic, in short, has been a complex of private and local liberties. Its great merit has been not equality, but freedom. Yet there are signs that public affection for this Republic, and understanding of it, are diminishing in our day. Sometimes we seem nearly to have arrived at the condition in which Cicero found the Roman Republic in his time: when, he wrote in *The Republic,* the Roman commonwealth seemed like an ancient painting, its colors faded and no skilled restorer to be found. Well, it is not too late for us to restore; and the intelligent conservative does more than cling to what has survived of an ancient order: he also rebuilds.

The conservative endeavors to conserve certain great and ancient things. He endeavors to conserve the religious and moral traditions that make us more than beasts. He endeavors to conserve the legacy of Western civilization, the wisdom of our ancestors, that makes us more than barbarians. And he endeavors to conserve that civil social order, political and economic, which has been developed through the trials of many generations, and which confers upon us a tolerable measure of justice and order and freedom. In the present age, the conservative is particularly sedulous to conserve freedom. We stand in no immediate peril of material want or of anarchy. But we are in danger, almost imminently, of a loss of freedom that would make us less than truly human. The modern conservative, therefore, tends to emphasize the claims of liberty, though in another age he might need to emphasize the claims of charity and duty. But if he is true to his own principles, he does not forget that every freedom is married to a responsibility.

The great contest in the modern world is not between two theories of economics, "socialism" and "capitalism," as Bernard Shaw tried to convince us. Rather, the real struggle is between traditional society, with its religious and moral and political inheritance, and collectivism (under whatever name), with its passion for reducing humanity to a mere tapioca pudding of identical producers and consumers. There is far more to this struggle than questions of profits and wages. But nowadays we are menaced by an economic collectivism which, if triumphant, would put an end not merely to a free economy, but to freedom of every description. Therefore it is worthwhile to say a little about the necessity for economic freedom.

Without a free economy, freedom of any sort is most difficult to maintain. The Republic is more important than any especial economic domination; yet the Republic cannot endure without an economy substantially free. There are two principal reasons why—given the conditions prevalent in modern America, and the political institutions that are ours—a free economy is essential to the preservation of freedom in general: to intellectual freedom, to civil liberties, to representative government, to freedom of private action. The first of these is that men and women can enjoy external freedom only if they are subject to no single, absolute master for their subsistence. The

second of these is that ordinary integrity requires ordinary rewards, and that in a collectivistic economy (whether called "capitalistic" or "socialistic," or what you will) the old motives to integrity, the ancient reasons for responsible conduct, are lacking.

On Freedom

First, a few words about the former reason. Men and women must eat. If they are dependent upon a solitary power or a solitary individual for their subsistence, they are slaves. They can act in any external respect only upon the sufferance of that master. If that master is the state, they have no alternative employment; they must obey, or live on air; and the state, because of its impersonality, can be a harder master, more devoid of charity and generosity, than any medieval lord.

To say that the "democratic" state would not deprive anyone of liberty is to play upon words. The democratic state, like any other, is directed by individuals, with all the failings to which humanity is heir, especially the failing of the lust for power. To suppose that the mass-state would be always just and generous toward its slaves is to suppose that there would exist, upon all its levels, a class of philosopher-kings superior to human frailty, purged of lust and envy and petty ambition. But in modern America we have no such class to draw upon; indeed, often we seem to be doing what we can to abolish that sense of inherent responsibility and high honor which compensates a patriarchal or feudal society for its lack of private liberty. It is more probable, as George Santayana suggests, that we would be the subjects of a host of squalid oligarchs, devoid of the high sense of responsibility. The Republic would have perished.

And a few words about the second reason. Most people do not act, and cannot, out of a regard for the general welfare. In any economy, our indolence and selfishness require incentives. Some few persons always will act out of altruism; but they will not be numerous enough to sustain a modern economy, once the old incentives of advancement, profit, and acquisition of property are gone. This sad truth already has flashed upon the minds of the more serious socialists in England, dismayed at the flaws in their own creation, and has led to ominous talk among them of "new incentives"—"the stick as well as the carrot."

For the conserving of freedom of any sort, then, the economy must be free in considerable measure. I repeat that much of the popular discussion of economic questions is obsolete, because it is founded, especially in America, upon the assumption that we still are living in a nineteenth-century condition characterized by the pressure of population upon food-supply. But the real problems of the twentieth century are different from those of the nineteenth, often especially in the economic sphere, and are in some respects more difficult to approach. Our conservative task is to reconcile personal freedom with the claims of modern technology, and to try to humanize an age in which Things are in the saddle. The triumph of technology, though it has solved for the time being, here in America, the ancient problem of material want, has created new problems. But we need not march on, as if propelled by some ineluctable destiny, toward a complete collectivization of economic life, the exploded ideal of the nineteenth-century socialists.

We can no longer afford to bow before ideology. Thinking is a painful process; but only by thought can ideology be kept in check; no ideologue ever was beaten on his own ground, except by another ideologue. It is vain to appeal to a theoretical "freedom" of the nineteenth century. It is worse than vain to suppose that, by simply repeating the words "freedom," "democracy," and "progress," we can reconcile a system of impersonal economic consolidation with the ancient personal liberties of our civilization. The person whom Mr. Sidney Hook calls the "ritualistic

FUND FOR THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC



Kreuttner

"Our next completely tax-free project will be the publication of three pamphlets, entitled: 'Anti-Intellectual Aspects of Political Morality,' 'The Plausibility of Implausibility,' and 'Double-Talk: The Meaningless Epithet Used by Irresponsible Reactionaries to Obstruct Progress.'"

liberal" seems to think that all we have to do to keep our freedom is to complain constantly and irresponsibly that our freedom is being lost. Yet many of these same ritualistic liberals applaud the very economic and social processes that are reducing the domain of freedom. I hope that conservatives will do something more than this.

We cannot afford merely to drift with the current of events, applying the pragmatic solution of considering every case simply upon its own passing merits. Present policies tend directly toward the establishment of an economic collectivism, under one name or another, inimical to the Republic. Certain measures of taxation, for instance, most conspicuous in Britain but differing only in degree in America, operate to destroy private enterprise in the old sense, to abolish the inheritance of property and the sense of responsibility that accompanies inheritance, and to substitute, in the long run, state compulsion for the ancient motives to integrity. Little serious thought seems to be given to the consequences, for one thing, of continuing inheritance-taxes at their present rate; yet they now constitute confiscation, and are a levy upon capital, not a voluntary contribution out of income toward the maintenance of the Republic. A society as rich as ours can afford to tolerate rich men and women—and can afford to encourage, indeed, the bequest and inheritance of large properties.

No social institution does more to develop decent leadership and a sense of responsibility than does the inheritance of large properties, and of the duties that accompany those properties. Tocqueville, observing a century and a quarter ago the American hostility toward inherited wealth, remarked that great fortunes confer benefits of many sorts upon the whole of society—in leadership, in the encouragement of the arts, in the support of letters, in the nurture of novel undertakings; while a multitude of petty competences, rags to riches and back to rags in one generation, encourages only arrogance and the expenditure of wealth in evanescent display and creature-comforts. I am not suggesting that the remedy for all our ills lies in repealing the inheritance-tax; I am merely saying that we need to think through such problems as this afresh, and to do our thinking free from the slogans of the ideologues.

And if inherited wealth brings some measure of responsibility to a commonwealth, so do the old disciplines of thrift, self-advancement, and personal ownership. Some of the more intelligent Americans, in every class and occupation, now are aware of the menace of irresponsibility in economic life, which soon communicates itself to political life: the irresponsibility of the salaried managers of vast corporations, of civil servants vested with brief authority upon which there is small check, of labor-union officials who may have risen to high place principally through the arts of the demagogue. A Republic does not endure forever upon the moral and social capital of an earlier time. A sense of responsibility is produced by hard lessons, by private risk and accountability, by a humane education, by religious principle, by inherited rights and duties. A Republic whose leaders are the flies of a summer cannot expect to obtain ordinary integrity without the old motives to integrity; it will turn, in desperation, to the hero-administrator, the misty figure somewhere at the summit—and, in the end, that hero-administrator no longer will be found.

Perpetual Children

It is not only the process of economic consolidation and the operation of positive law that diminish the sense of responsibility guarding ordered freedom in the Republic. Other measures, more technological than directly political, operate to make man into a machine-server, with a great deal of idleness but little true leisure, free in the sense that no one oppresses him directly, but servile in the sense that he has been deprived of the old interests and hopes in life: failing to come to man's estate, he remains a perpetual child. In our present equilibrium, here in America, we may seem to have given a large measure of economic prosperity to the mass of men and women, at small cost in freedom. But I am thinking of what this Republic, and all the world, may be fifty years from now.

Not being high-school debaters, conservatives do not possess facile and simple solutions to all these discontents. They merely say that the first step toward curing a malady is to diagnose it correctly. I suggest that we must find our happiness in work, or not at all; and that servile work, however economically profitable, is irreconcilable with social freedom. With John Henry Newman, in his reply to Sir Robert Peel more than a century gone, I am not offering any new ideology; I am merely appealing to those principles of morals and politics which have been known to mankind for a great while. "I am proposing no measures, but exposing a fallacy, and resisting a pretense. Let Benthamism reign, if men have no aspirations; but do not tell them to be romantic, and then solace them with glory."

Freedom, after all, is a romantic aspiration, earnestly desired by only a minority of men and women. (Romantic aspirations, I may add, are what make life worth living.) Only a small minority, too, feel clearly the call of responsibility. But, that freedom and that responsibility gone, the habitual freedom and the security of the great mass of men and women must slip away too, in the economic sphere as in the political. There are some among us who do not desire to be solaced with the glories of *Brave New World*. Political economy had its beginnings in the work of philosophers who, whatever their deficiencies, were concerned primarily with the extension of freedom. Political economy is far gone in decay when it becomes no better than an apology for the reduction of men and women to a condition of prosperous servility.

The success of the American Republic, and the preservation of our old liberties, have been achieved in considerable part by our aversion, here in America, to divorcing theory from prudence. No other society ever had problems so complex as ours; but no society before our age ever had such a wealth of learning available, and such an economic margin, to aid in the solving of problems. The analysis of the real meaning of freedom, and the examination of the nature of responsibility, are available to us Americans at the slight cost of a little of our idle time. Yet many

(*Continued on p. 119*)

The First "R"

ABE KALISH

Tests given in 1955 to ninth grade pupils in the city of Washington showed that 62 per cent of the pupils were one to six years behind the ninth-grade reading level. Tests in New York City for the same year revealed that 55 per cent of the ninth grade pupils were one to six years behind normal reading ability.

With these figures came a statement from New York City's Superintendent of Schools: "There was nothing startling in the findings. In no event should they be construed as an indictment of the methods used in teaching reading in the elementary grades."

Shortly afterwards, the educational editor of the *New York Times* visited one of the city's schools and wrote a "blow-by-blow" description of modern teaching methods. Briefly, the report shows that children are required to learn words *before* they know the sounds of the letters.

"The teacher wrote the word 'walk' on the blackboard. She walked gingerly across the room. 'What am I doing?,' she asked hopefully.

" 'Skipping,' a six-year-old suggested.

" 'No,' she said. 'Come with me,' and the teacher and the child took several paces.

" 'You are walking,' someone said, greatly pleased.

" 'That's right,' the teacher nodded happily, 'and this word on the board?'

" 'Walk,' the children said in unison.

"Then began an hour's wrestling with the word. . . .The main emphasis was on seeing 'walk' in print, associating it with actual walking and then recognizing the word and knowing its meaning."

Old-timers, who learned to read by phonics, maintain that these modern teaching methods (roughly similar to Chinese picture-reading, but without its logic) are a basic cause of poor reading ability, with consequent failures in dependent subjects. But since old-timers can not produce statistics out of the past, their claims are easily pooh-poohed.

Not so easily dismissed is the current experience of Catholic parochial schools. Largely following the curricula of a generation ago, their 4,000,000 pupils (about 12 per cent of our total school population) offer a pilot model for those willing to see.

However, because they have little centralized record-keeping, anyone seeking information must go to the individual schools. Even these schools present problems to the would-be observer. For example, at St. Anthony's parochial high school in Washington, which I visited, the principal spends half her time teaching. "We have to choose here," she explained, "between administration and teaching. We choose teaching."

Luckily, she had the results of the Science Research Reading tests given in September 1955: 33 per cent of the ninth grade were one to two years below their reading level; 67 per cent were at the ninth grade level or above.

Next door, St. Anthony's elementary school averaged over 45 pupils a room. To this school parishioners send their children without charge. Others pay two dollars a month. Here pupils have reading and religion in every grade, arithmetic and geography from grades three to eight, American history in every grade (except the sixth, when they study ancient history). Home work: one hour a day.

The school's principal, extremely conscious of the value of her teachers' time, handled a lot of their clerical work, refrained from using the public address system (except for a few minutes in the morning), strictly barred "community announcements." "Children are here to study," she said, "I permit nothing to distract them if I can help it."

When I inquired if phonics were used here, she turned me over to a first-grade teacher, whose class remained unattended but quiet while she told me that the children are first taught the sounds of the letters. They start to read as soon as they can put letters together to form words.

By the end of the first year, the children have read three books of the Faith and Freedom series. (One book has the title *My Reading and Phonics Book.*) They can read such phrases as "a necklace of blue beads" and "a vine with pea pods."

Usually, three or four first-graders can not keep up with the class. These children receive remedial instruction. In the rare cases when they do not respond to such help, they are kept back.

I asked about the word-guessing method of learning to read, and was told that the school had tried it a few years ago but had discarded it: the teachers found that it confused the child and slowed his reading progress. Some children now in the upper grades still show effects of the experiment. They guess at words, their spelling is poor and they read below their grade level.

The school gives its third-to-eighth grade pupils Metropolitan Achievement tests in reading. Making spot checks, I found that in a third grade room with 47 pupils, 94 per cent were at their reading level or better. In a seventh grade room of 54 pupils, 74 per cent were at or above their reading level. Of the 39 pupils in the eighth grade room whom I sampled, 71 per cent were at least at their normal reading level.

I asked the principal if she would try on the eighth grade pupils a recent Gallup Poll spelling test originally given to Canadians and Americans of high school level (to compare spelling ability on both sides of the border). The Canadians, under old-fashioned education, averaged 63 per cent, the Americans, 49.5 per cent. The eighth grade of St. Anthony's scored 58 per cent.

What do these figures prove about old-fashioned education? Nothing so final that those looking for an "out" can not dismiss them with a "progressive" cliché. Undoubtedly also, there is room for wider and more detailed sampling in this field. Nevertheless, this irreducible fact remains: When phonics is the basic means for teaching children to read, and when teachers are allowed to concentrate on their main job of teaching, close to 70 per cent of the children in parochial schools can acquire sufficient reading ability to handle the normal work of their grade. Public schools might well grade themselves by this standard.

ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

In Shakespeare's Company

The one consistent (though, as I shall show in a minute, not unmitigated) joy of this season was the extended visit of the Old Vic Company. They were playing, of course, Shakespeare; but they were playing, above all, theater.

If only those fugitives from the Stork Club, the garment center and the International Set who double as Broadway producers would go for a season to Old Vic's school! True, not even such an exposure would infuse them with taste; for taste is one of the unpurchasable graces. But at least they would learn that stagecraft is a matter of discipline; that in an art which works through language purity of diction and the melody of verbal chant are incomparably more important than the whimsy of the director and the costume designer; that actors are nothing but devoted servants; that, in short, the only meaning of the theater is the play.

All this, of course, is unknown on Broadway. Here stagecraft is a matter of labored stunts. Grunts and squeals silence the music of language. The insanely overrated director reigns supreme. Actors are stars who impersonate themselves. The play, in short, is *not* the thing. The "production" is.

The Old Vic Company, in contrast, is a repertory theater. That is, it is an integrated group of people who are not hired to perform as trained seals, and in the one capacity for which they have been trained; but people who are engaged in the permanent and devout service of dramatic creativeness. For example, one night Mr. John Neville plays Romeo—and the very next night he plays the pathetically repulsive Thersites in *Troilus and Cressida*. The point is not so much that Old Vic avoids typecasting. The important point is that in true repertory theater the actor (though he remains, of course, an egocentric ham) grows into all the dimensions of human experience: one night Romeo, the next night Thersites, the third night Macduff and the fourth Richard II—this is a liberal education in living which will lift any actor to his very height of human radiance.

Such human radiance the Old Vic company communicates anew each time. This year, they played *Macbeth, Richard II, Romeo and Juliet,* and *Troilus and Cressida*. Of the four evenings, two (*Macbeth* and *Richard II*) I expect to remember the rest of my life. *Romeo and Juliet* remains in the Old Vic performance just as awkwardly unsatisfactory as I have always found stage performances of *Romeo and Juliet* to be, in several decades of theater-going and in several languages. (I shall return to this daring statement in a second.) And *Troilus and Cressida* was without any doubt the most impudent display of a director's arrogance I have ever seen. Thus, a viable score: two hits, one dud and one unforgivable error.

The first two acts of *Macbeth* remained a bit earthbound because of overdone stage frolics and an infatuation with props; and, alas, because Miss Coral Browne chose to discover in Lady Macbeth the modish traits of a tart. Even so, you could always close your eyes—and then there came those overwhelming torrents of language, spoken with Old Vic's courage to make words sing. Finally, the third act was perfection. Even Miss Browne had in the meantime learned that Lady Macbeth is a woman of tragic depth. Mr. Paul Rogers' *Macbeth* was the definitive realization of this miserable man who is tortured by weakness the way one is haunted by furies.

Richard II, one of Shakespeare's less worthy plays, was in this performance a joy from the very beginning. As if he were practising finger exercises for *King Lear,* Shakespeare takes here the measure of such emotions as rage over ingratitude, and of such experiences as shameless betrayal. But these are indeed just finger exercises; and the play hardly ever involves your own passions. And yet, *Richard II* was perhaps the finest evening of this year's Old Vic festival. The actors (primarily Mr. John Neville as Richard) may have profited from the very mediocrity of the play: Their parts were not so overwhelmed, and at moments crushed, as are the actors in Shakespeare's supreme tragedies by the power of unleashed passion and of the transfigured word.

This, at least in my experience, is what unfailingly happens in every performance of *Romeo and Juliet*. In the theater, I am carried back to the peaks I reached when I first read *Romeo and Juliet* only when I close my eyes. It's not just that no Juliet (certainly not Miss Claire Bloom) can approach the loveliness of the undying image of love. It is, above all, because *Romeo and Juliet* is poetry and ought to be *read* (aloud, preferably). Just as it is fallacious to try and captivate the intellectual substance of a great novel in a film, just so it seems to me futile to *act* poetry.

While my reservations in regard to *Romeo and Juliet* may be entirely subjective, I should like to file my protest against Old Vic's *Troilus and Cressida* with the objective emphasis of a whiplash. The company has permitted Mr. Tyrone Guthrie to come to Mr. Shakespeare's rescue and get, by clever "direction," some sense into the clumsy playwright's mess. Like the genius he is, Mr. Guthrie simply turned the play inside out and used the bloody guts as stage props. His brilliant idea was to dress the heroes of the Trojan legend in costumes of about 1914 and then let them act, leap, leer, pinch and goose as if they had all read Krafft-Ebing.

The result is far more hilarious than Mr. Guthrie intended. The play is turned into moronic gibberish by the simple fact that Prussian officers and Colonel Blimps keep constantly referring to such incomprehensible figures as Hector, Priam, Paris, Ulysses, Cassandra, Nestor, Menelaus. To make everything crystal-clear in *Troilus and Cressida* (which was Mr. Guthrie's professed ambition) the persons who people the play have been divested of their identity as mythological figures and of their dramatic meaning. Everything else Mr. Guthrie left untouched.

Mr. Guthrie, however, is a fleeting blight and the Old Vic Company will survive the attack. For Shakespeare is watching over them from heaven.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Spurious as Store Teeth

WILLMOORE KENDALL

This exasperating and pretentious book (*Citadel*, by William S. White: Harper and Brothers, $3.75) puts itself forward as the "Story of the U.S. Senate," told out of a deep conviction that the "kind of society we are to maintain" depends upon the "vitality and honor" of the upper chamber of our federal legislature. But in point of fact it redeems neither of the commitments implicit in these claims. Save on the level of anecdote, it adds little or nothing to our knowledge of Senate history, and rehashes in only the sketchiest and most casual manner the findings of earlier Senate historians. Its thesis as to the relation between the vitality of the Senate and the character of our society—surely the former depends on the latter, rather than the other way 'round?—is merely asserted, not demonstrated. Nor are we ever told what kind of society the author thinks we *ought* to maintain: He would like it, clearly, to be equipped with a Senate much like the one we have. But he seems to have given not one moment's thought to those current trends in public policy, strongly entrenched moreover in the Senate he so much admires, that by undermining the power and significance of our several states must, before long, deprive the Senate of its traditional —and only possible—meaning. His book should have been called: *Random Notes on the Senate: The Story of a* Times- *Man's Infatuation with an Institution.*

Institution, mind you, with a great big capital I—which of course is how it should be written, and how Mr. White himself always writes it. Which brings me to the book's one considerable strength, namely: its clarity and vigor. First, in setting forth what I have just called the traditional and only possible meaning of the Senate. Second, in defending those characteristics of the Senate that are inseparable from that meaning.

"The Senate," Mr. White writes, "though the Senate of the United States, is in fact [*in fact*, not also] the Senate of the States, so that never will the cloud of uniformism roll over the sun of the individual and the minority. . . . For the Institution protects and expresses that last, true heart of the democratic thesis: the triumphant distinction and oneness of the individual and of the little State, the infinite variety in each which is the juice of national life."

He recognizes—no, proclaims—that those who would like representation in the Senate to reflect differences in population have as little right on their side as, say, the man who seeks to nullify his marriage contract on the grounds that his wife has got fat less rapidly than he: "Deliberately [the Institution] puts Rhode Island, in terms of power, on equal footing with Illinois."

And he asserts unabashedly what political theorist you have to go to for a vindication of such arrangements: Calhoun of South Carolina, he writes, laid down "the most classical, and still the most irreplaceable dictum of our practical politics. This was the Doctrine of the Concurrent Majority . . . [which] postulated that this was a country of so many harsh and fundamental divisions that the central demand of the art of politics was to accommodate and merge and thus ameliorate the divergences lest they become inflamed beyond cure."

And again: We must not "press upon any minority, sectional or otherwise, policies or laws that are quite literally intolerable, though of course care must be taken not to equate the truly intolerable with the merely repugnant [e.g., one suspects, desegregation of the public schools]."

Moreover, he regards the filibuster as an indispensable corollary of the Concurrent Majority, approves of the seniority principle, and has no quarrel with the kind of power the two together confer upon Senators from the South: ". . . the Senate might be described as the South's revenge upon the North for Gettysburg." And he takes delight in the Senate hierarchy: "The inner life of the Senate is controlled by the Inner Club [which] . . . makes the decisions as to what *in general* is proper in the Institution and what *in general* its conclusions should be on high issues." Nor will he have any truck with the notion that the Senate's majority- and minority-leaders should be "responsible" to the political parties whose labels they bear: ". . . such an arrangement . . . is . . . demonstrably heretical unless one wishes to overturn the triune system of government that is fundamental to all."

These unfashionable sentiments will predictably earn Mr. White a quick reputation for being a "Conservative" —justified in the sense that he states with genuine conviction many of the tenets of a true conservative's credo about the Senate, unjustified in the sense that they seem to be the *only* matters on which he fails to go all the way with the Liberals. Thus:

He hero-worships Hubert Humphrey, and, out of the past, George Norris. He heaps scorn on those—those Senators even—who have questioned the "wisdom and *honor* of the actions of the Executive in the China crisis that . . . left the mainland in Communist hands."

He deems the censure of Senator McCarthy and the defeat of the Bricker Amendment as two of the Senate's great historic achievements. And he seriously believes that General MacArthur precipitated a constitutional crisis when he sought to create popular sentiment in favor of more vigorous prosecution of the Korean War—so that the Senate Committee that did MacArthur in

saved the principle of civilian supremacy over the military, and thus the Constitution itself!

He thinks it ill behooves even Senators to dream dreams of investigating the Central Intelligence Agency—on the grounds, if you please, that "the work of the . . . country's lawful intelligence agencies" would be "complicated" by such an investigation. Indeed, he deplores the very idea of "punitive" Senate investigations, conducted in a "spirit of prosecution"—no matter who is being investigated, and no matter what he is suspected of being up to.

Finally, White believes that some Senate inquiries have performed a useful educational function, but, astonishingly, would not include in their number the McCarran Committee. And he can write, with both McCarthy and McCarran in mind: "the Senate Office Building . . . stank with the odor of fear, and the odor of monstrous silliness. The presumed and alleged objective was to seek out and destroy what was supposed to be [but was not, of course] a vast Communist 'apparatus' that was gnawing at the Republic's vitals."

Mr. White's conservatism, his apparent devotion to tradition, his seeming reverence for the intent of the Framers, are all as spurious as store teeth. On the great issues of the age—e.g., the growth of Executive power and centralization—he aligns himself consistently with the forces—and Senators—that are bent on so transforming our society as to make nonsense of the Concurrent Majority.

Mr. White leaves no room for doubt as to *how much* he loves the Senate. What he fails to do is explain *why* he loves it.

Many Poets and One

The Criterion Book of Modern American Verse, Edited with an Introduction by W. H. Auden. 336 pp. New York: Criterion Books. $5.00

Poems, by Marcia Nardi. 48 pp. Denver: Alan Swallow. $2.00

By my rough count, this makes Auden's sixteenth anthology. Previously, he has brought his taste, his scissors, and his lively prefaces to the Greeks, the Elizabethan song writers, and the entire body of English poetry, as well as to many particular authors, from Kierkegaard to Poe to John Betjeman to himself. Now he has ventured his most delicate job to date: a sampler from the verse of his own contemporaries; moreover, in his adopted country.

The only other poet to try this recently has been Yeats, and the result was a scandal, because Yeats, then seventy, played his favorite role of "the wild old wicked man" to the hilt, and included a number of poets the London literary world had not officially recognized. At forty-nine, Auden is more diplomatic, and admits just about everybody who is anybody. The conspicuous omissions are Laura Riding, whom Auden once called "the only living philosophical poet," but who declines to be anthologized; T. S. Eliot, whose thirty years of British citizenship apparently rule him out; and Auden himself, who, having been an American citizen since 1946, ought on the same grounds to be ruled in, but claims the editorial prerogative of modesty.

Of the three generations covered, the first, which emerged from 1915 to 1930, is the largest and the best. Forty-one names are represented—everyone from Gertrude Stein to Don Marquis, Stephen Crane to Marianne Moore—and the sight is very impressive. The second generation, emerging less confidently from 1930 to 1945, is without any major figure (Auden himself being absent), but the quality of the minor writers, from Theodore Roethke and Elizabeth Bishop to John Berryman and Robert Lowell, is very high. It is the young, the poets—if that's the word—born since 1918 and whose work has appeared since 1945, who seem the least spirited, the least youthful, the least readable, of all.

In his introduction, Auden points out that the most distinctive mark of all American poets has been their unlikeness to each other. Every man has been his own tradition. But, he adds in an uneasy footnote, "the undeniable appearance in the States during the last fifteen years or so of a certain literary conformity, of a proper and authorized way to write poetry is a new and disquieting symptom. . . ." And no confirmation could be more conclusive than the final pages of his anthology.

A glossy mildness prevails. There is absolutely no "expense of spirit" anywhere. The tone and diction are uniformly cool, competent, aloof, and —worst of all—merely ironic. Everything connotes forceps, tweezers, rubber gloves, antiseptics. No matter what the subject of the poems may be—Beowulf, Beasts, Japan, Emblems of Evening—it lies limp, etherized, and bloodless, while a detached technique operates.

But poetry has not become altogether extinct in the United States. At least one new poet, Marcia Nardi, can write lines hot with human identity. Her first book is small, humbly bound, and issued by a man who sets the type himself and will not be able, probably, to buy advertising space in the *New York Times.* Though a number of the poems have previously appeared in distinguished magazines, Mr. Auden's anthology includes none of them. But then, Samuel Johnson's edition of the English poets did not include Christopher Smart, who now seems to have been almost the only *live* poet in Great Britain in 1756.

The best way to recommend someone as good and unexpected as Miss Nardi would be to print one of her poems. Lacking this opportunity, may I say that her poetry is "modern" in the explicit sense that, like Rilke's or Robert Frost's, it is written out of an earned aloneness, and addressed with trust and candor to anyone honest enough to listen? It is no more "difficult" than Verlaine's, or Emily Dickinson's. The poet who sings

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here—and she *does* sing—has been in love, afraid, delighted, sorry for herself, outraged, foolish, and, rarest of all, *awed*. I have been leafing through this *petit testament* for only six weeks, but I find that a dozen of its amulet lines and phrases are already as permanent a part of my verbal consciousness as any I have ever known.

ROBERT PHELPS

Behind the Screen

Pitchman, by Robin Moore. 352 pp. New York: Coward-McCann. $3.95

Robin Moore, who "went into television" in 1949 and "still retains an active interest" in it, is the latest businessman-turned-author to expose to public view the conditions existing in the business in which he has prospered. As a novel it is a sorry, monotonous performance. But as a picture of the television industry, painted by a man who has lived with his subject, *Pitchman* will repay examination. It shows us the face behind the screen; and as we gaze at that countenance, with all its revolting features, we marvel—not that TV is no better than it is, but that it manages, against desperate odds, to be no worse.

The world into which Mr. Moore takes us is one in which double-dealing, treachery, false friendship, bribery, bluff and cowardice flourish; in which most forms of dishonesty pay off; in which the interests of client, advertising agency, independent packager and network mill about in endless, crooked conflict. "I never realized what a vicious business this is," says one of Mr. Moore's characters. "In twenty years of radio and television I never saw an ethic when a new account and a lot of loot were involved," declares another. "I was foreclosing on my favors," explains the narrator at one point. And an agency man, proud of his company's resources in the field of bribery, boasts: "Over at MetArt we keep the finest harem on Madison Avenue."

These brief quotations tell the story. If anyone thinks it is an unimportant story, let him ponder what still another character had to say of TV in 1952: "The minds of the people of this country will damned near be controlled by it."

BEN RAY REDMAN

REVIEWED IN BRIEF

Varieties of Human Value, by Charles Morris. 209 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. $5.00

Professor Morris is an outstanding leader of the collegium of analytical philosophers who have in this century systematically sucked the substance from thought. The guiding spirit of the *International Encyclopedia of the Unified Sciences,* he is the analyst's analyst. This book is an attempt to study the meaning of values by statistically comparing the preferences shown by college students of diverse cultures for thirteen different "conceptions of the good life," varying from "live with wholesome, carefree enjoyment" to "obey the cosmic purposes." Needless to say, this last, the nearest to an expression of the traditional beliefs by which civilized men have lived, comes out pretty badly. Even this Kinsey of philosophy has the grace to seem somewhat bewildered as to just what he has achieved.

The Making of Modern Mind, by Leonard Carmichael. 88 pp. Houston: The Elsevier Press. $2.00

Mr. Carmichael, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution and psychologist, not only believes in Progress; he believes that whatever is, by the workings of Progress, is better than what was: "As a result of these developments [the achievements of the modern age], modern minds that may be inferior in intrinsic capacities, when compared with the minds of such men as Plato and Aristotle, are, nevertheless, more powerful in many respects than were the minds of these superlatively great men."

The FBI Story, by Don Whitehead. 334 pp. New York: Random House. $4.95

Mr. Whitehead has written a long-needed book. It is "official" only in the sense that he was given access to much information previously unavailable. But it is straightforward and in no way sycophantic. It is a tribute to the FBI and Edgar Hoover, but only because the facts of reality dictate so. That an organization with such inherently dangerous powers has functioned at all times strictly within the limits of the Constitution is a triumph of the men who make up that organization. Mr. Whitehead presents the record entertainingly and soberly in a book which contains some fascinating bits of hitherto unpublished information—for example, that the FBI first learned about the atomic-bomb project not from official sources but from its surveillance of West-Coast Communists.

The Reason of State, by Giovanni Botero. Translated by P. J. and D. P. Waley. 298 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press. $5.50

The lines of thought in political theory opened by Machiavelli and developed by Hobbes have remained dominant for several hundred years. In recent decades, in fact, as "political science," "policy science," and "behavioral science," they have dominated the field to the practical exclusion of political philosophy in its traditional Western sense. Giovanni Botero's *Reason of State* was written a few decades after Machiavelli's *Prince,* and in direct dispute with his fundamental premises. As conscious as Machiavelli of the role of prudence in the affairs of state, Botero is no purely abstract theorist; but he insists that the foundations of politics are laid in principle. In this most Machiavellian of ages, the republishing of this anti-Machiavellian treatise is a first-rate contribution to the rehabilitation of political theory.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by Boris Meissner, edited and with a chapter on the Twentieth Party Congress, by John S. Reshetar, Jr. 276 pp. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. $5.00

The Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania has provided in this publication a very useful handbook of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between the Nineteenth and the Twentieth Party Congresses, from 1952 to 1956. It is primarily a collection of political reports and lists of the changing membership of the leading committees of the Party.

(Reviewed by Frank S. Meyer)

To the Editor

Principled Men Dissent

As an effective, guiding force for America, conservatism may or may not have missed its last chance by the defeat of Senator Taft in Chicago; it may or may not have died in the abortion of 1952; but one thing is clear: it *will* fail if Eisenhowerism becomes the permanent fixation it threatens to become.

These . . . thoughts are provoked by the comment in your "The Week" of January 5 that "as for us, we'd like a little *dis*-harmony." This session, I'd like a little adherence to principle.

Birmingham, Ala. JAMES BAUMGARTNER

Plastered with Kreuttner

A few weeks ago, you sent out a broadside containing cartoons by Kreuttner. This is easily the most entertaining piece of paper I have ever received. Since then I have gone through all my back issues and have cut out his cartoons and plastered them all over the walls.

Notre Dame, Ind. ROSS LUMMIS

Israel and the American Jew

. . . it has occurred to me that in spite of NATIONAL REVIEW's record of near-perfect comprehension of issues that range from academic freedom to Yemen (can't think of an "issue" that begins with Z), your staff can use some pointers on the attitude of American Jews toward Israel.

Granted that NR has a right to expect *every* American—Jew or not—to place loyalty to the United States above loyalty to any other state, particularly when Americans are free to go to another state if they wish to do so. Yet, I do not believe it amiss to ask NR to understand that while the U.S. accords the protection of its laws and customs to millions of American Jews, Israel is Papa-and-Mama to *all* Jews in one sense that can never be attained by the U.S. or any other country.

In her *will*, in her *concern*, if not in her capacity, Israel weeps and bleeds when a Jew, *qua* Jew, is victimized anywhere on earth. No other country weeps or bleeds for Jews. Israel will strain her resources and make sacrifices to help her children. . . .

Of late NR has been pounding the table, quite properly, to direct attention to "the inner imperatives of our civilization." NR said: "In denying [Britain and France]—as in every ultimate betrayal—it is ourselves that we deny. . . ."

Denying Papa-and-Mama is also an ultimate betrayal—perhaps the most ultimate betrayal of all.

New York City AARON H. BROWN

Accustomed to Our Ways

The first two or three issues of your magazine I found interesting, but was unable to decide whether I liked it or disliked it. The funny thing is, it seems to grow on you. At least it did on me. I actually look forward to each issue. It is really quite refreshing to read such downright outspoken criticism. . . . Today, when anyone acts or speaks as if they have "percolating" blood, I feel like congratulating them.

MRS. T. C. MCFADDEN

North Hollywood, Cal.

Sukarno's "Guided Democracy"

The latest reports from Indonesia inform us that all is not well. What is happening in Sumatra is not a revolution; it is the same thing that happened a long time ago in the South Moluccas; it is a denial of an assumed and unwarranted authority by Mr. Sukarno, who seeks to impose the will of his Communist-tinged authority on many divergent races and lands. . . .

Mr. Sukarno visits Washington and he visits Moscow. He tries to be all things in both places. His newly-invented type of democracy, a "guided democracy," shows that either he does not understand democracy or he is trying to cover up his manipulations. The world knows that democracy is a principle. And a principle cannot be guided. Moreover, something that can be guided, can also easily be misguided.

The South Moluccan Republic was proclaimed on April 25, 1950, as a sovereign and independent democratic republic, when its people saw that Mr. Sukarno had no intention to respect and to retain the Indonesian Federation that was set up under the supervision of the United Nations. Instead he forced upon all the peoples a one-state republic, in violation of all agreements. Resistance to this is inevitable.

New York City KAREL J. V. NIKIJULUW

WHAT IS THE REPUBLIC?

(*Continued from* p. 113)

of us seem to prefer to wander, thoughtless, into a devil's sabbath of whirling machinery, presided over by a commissar.

Liberals and radicals offer us no solution to our grand difficulties; they either are content to drift with the current of events, or urge us actually to row faster down the stream which they call Progress, but which the conservative knows to be Decadence. The Liberals and the radicals have forgotten the meaning of the Republic. But conservatives, who were not born yesterday, know that men and women have free will. A Republic dies only when its citizens have neglected the wisdom of their ancestors and the methods of right reason. There are more conservatives left among us than there were good men left in Sodom; and I think that, God willing, the conservatives will yet prevail.

One of the most eloquent of American conservative thinkers was a woman, Agnes Repplier. Miss Repplier was not inclined to exchange the reality of the American Republic for some Utopia of the collectivists. Loving her country, she wrote, "If patriotism becomes an emotion too expansively benevolent to make men willing to live and die for something concrete like a king or a country, we shall have nothing left to fall back upon but sexual love, which is a strong individual urge, but lacks breadth and scope of purpose. It burned Troy; but it did not build Rome, or secure the Magna Carta, or frame the Constitution of the United States." Love of the Republic shelters all our other loves. That love is worth some sacrifice.

(Reprints of Dr. Kirk's article will be available from NATIONAL REVIEW, *211 East 37th St., New York 16, New York. Prices on request.)*